The L1 signature primitive is named (ML-DSA-87 / 'Dilithium-5', per the CGO's Decrypt statement) and the KEM family is named in press (ML-KEM / CRYSTALS-Kyber, FIPS 203), but the inventory remains incomplete: the ML-DSA and ML-KEM parameter sets are not fixed in any Naoris technical spec, and the consensus hash function (SHA-256, SHA-3, or other) is not specified in any public document. The ECDSA secp256k1 economic-layer exposure is documented on-chain via Etherscan. Deduction reflects parameter sets corroborated only by statement/press (not by spec or code) and the unspecified consensus hash.

The native L1 signing surface is claimed PQ-safe (lattice ML-DSA), which would be a structural strength if independently verifiable. Deduction: (a) the economic layer ($NAORIS on Ethereum) is Shor-breakable ECDSA secp256k1; (b) the consensus hash is unspecified so its Grover posture cannot be tagged; (c) the lattice-confidence discount applies; (d) the entire signing surface is a single lattice family (no Shor-diverse fallback) and the implementation is unverified.

Exactly ONE PQ family is deployed at the signing layer: lattice (ML-DSA / 'Dilithium-5'). Per the 1c rubric, '1 lattice-only = 5 (hard cap)'. No hash-based (SLH-DSA, XMSS) or code-based (Classic McEliece, BIKE) signature family is documented as deployed or planned for the L1. This lattice-monoculture is precisely the single-point-of-failure posture (SIKE-2022 precedent) that the Diversity Cap targets; the cap fires at QRI <= 60. Hard-capped at 5.

If the deployed scheme is ML-DSA-87 (the Level-5 mapping of 'Dilithium-5'), it is NIST Category 5 (highest), and ML-DSA is a NIST-standardized primitive (FIPS 204). This is a genuinely strong category claim on its face. Deduction: the parameter set is NOT confirmed in any public technical document (could be ML-DSA-44 cat 2, ML-DSA-65 cat 3, or ML-DSA-87 cat 5), the KEM category is unknown (algorithm unnamed), and the ECDSA secp256k1 economic layer is classical-128-bit and not a NIST PQC category. Score reflects a probable Category-5 signature claim discounted for unconfirmed parameter set.

No independent implementation audit of Naoris's ML-DSA code has been published; the GitHub org has no public repositories (checked 2026-06-02), so the code is closed-source and cannot be reviewed for constant-time posture, KyberSlash-class timing-leak resistance, library provenance (no liboqs / PQCA / named-audit attribution available), or formal-verification status (no Formosa-Crypto / EasyCrypt machine-checked proof cited for Naoris's specific implementation). ML-DSA itself is cryptanalytic Tier 3 (NIST-standardized), but the deployed implementation is unverifiable. Low score: the standard is mature, the implementation is unauditable.

Forge. For the native L1: addresses sign under a lattice scheme (ML-DSA / 'Dilithium-5'); revealing an ML-DSA public key on-chain does NOT enable Shor-based key recovery, since lattice signatures are not broken by Shor (subject to the lattice-confidence caveat and the unverified implementation). A protocol-level 'irreversible security transition' is described that blocks classical signing once PQ keys are adopted. Deduction is material because the circulating $NAORIS economic layer is ERC-20 on Ethereum under ECDSA secp256k1 with ~2,541 holder addresses whose public keys are revealed on spend - those ARE Shor-recoverable active keys. Active-key posture is strong for the L1, weak for the economic layer.

Forge. Native-L1 dormant balances sit on ML-DSA (lattice) addresses, Shor-resistant by construction (implementation unverified). Unlike Bitcoin's lost P2PK coins or dormant Ed25519/ECDSA balances, L1 cold funds are not forgeable by a future CRQC at the signature layer if the lattice implementation is correct. Deduction: dormant $NAORIS held in Ethereum wallets (ECDSA secp256k1) IS cold-key-exposed, and no migration policy off Ethereum is published.

Forge. Historical native-L1 transaction signatures are lattice (ML-DSA) and would remain unforgeable post-Shor (lattice-confidence caveat; unverified implementation). Deduction: (a) lattice carries the long-horizon confidence discount for very-long-lived signatures; (b) any signed message, attestation, or cross-chain 'trust proof' exported to EVM/Cosmos/Move chains that is verified under a classical scheme on the receiving side reintroduces forgeability; (c) the ERC-20 economic-layer signatures on Ethereum are ECDSA secp256k1 and forgeable post-Shor.

Decrypt (HNDL). Validator-to-validator transport encryption between dPoSec nodes is not described in any public document; there is no confirmation of a hybrid PQ KEM (e.g. X25519+ML-KEM per the IETF hybrid TLS draft) at the transport layer. ML-KEM (Kyber, FIPS 203) is named in press as part of the stack, but no parameter set is fixed, it is not documented as a hybrid combiner, and where/how it is used at transport is unstated. Harvested transport ciphertexts under a classical key exchange would be decryptable once Shor breaks the classical component. Low score: no documented hybrid PQ KEM at transport.

Anonymity. Naoris is designed for transparency and auditability: its mission is 'real-time on-chain trust scores' and 'Proof of Health' logs anchoring every validation event, device-integrity check, and anomaly result on-chain. This produces a dense, permanent, PUBLIC metadata ledger of device behavior, validator performance, and network topology - the opposite of transaction-graph privacy. No native shielding, confidential transactions, or stealth addresses are described. Low score: the architecture maximizes metadata visibility by design.

Anonymity. The validator set is invite-only ('strategic participants, investors, and validator operators'), with validator count, identity distribution, and RPC topology undisclosed; no public RPC-provider list, mempool/gossip observability detail, or validator metadata-retention policy is published. Per the rubric, the metadata-retention component scores zero when the policy is undeclared, and concentration cannot be assessed favorably for an undisclosed, invite-only set. Low score.

Anonymity. Naoris describes a 'Cross-Chain Trust Relay' exporting trust proofs to EVM, Cosmos, and Move-based ecosystems; these trust bundles are by design visible to receiving chains, expanding the on-chain metadata/correlation footprint beyond the Naoris L1. Bridge-side privacy is not addressed. Moderate-low: the cross-chain correlation surface is intentionally large (trust export is the product), not minimized.

Confidentiality. Naoris has no discrete-log / EC privacy primitives (no ElGamal ring signatures, no EC zk-SNARKs at the privacy layer), so Shor does NOT retroactively de-anonymize Naoris L1 history at the cryptographic layer the way it would for an EC-based shielded chain. The de-anonymization that remains is the ordinary (and by-design maximal) transparency of the ledger - already visible, not Shor-dependent. Scored as 'no Shor-breakable privacy crypto to break' rather than as positive confidentiality (there is none). Caveat: the ERC-20 economic layer on Ethereum (ECDSA secp256k1) is Shor-exposed.

Anonymity. No on-chain mixer, no commit-reveal shuffle, no cMix/mixnet infrastructure, no batch-ordering, no cover traffic is documented. Naoris provides no structural anonymity-set mechanism (and its transparency-first design is the opposite intent).

No public specification of crypto-agility for the L1: there is no documented mechanism for the chain to transition to a different PQ signature scheme (e.g. SLH-DSA per FIPS 205, or FN-DSA/Falcon per FIPS 206 IPD) if ML-DSA were cryptanalyzed, and no versioned-signature-type framework (EIP-7702/8141-style) is documented. Token governance 'Flash Votes' reference 'PQ cryptography' upgrades, but no protocol-enforced agility mechanism, quorum, or in-production switch instance is cited. Low-moderate: agility is asserted via governance language, not demonstrated by an architectural primitive with a verifiable instance.

A protocol-level 'irreversible security transition' blocks classical signing once a user adopts PQ keys, which is a per-user key-posture mechanism, and a 'Hybrid Mode (PQC + classical signing)' plus wallet/MPC/signing-system integration is described as a product. But there is no documented account-abstraction standard (ERC-4337/EIP-7702), no published key-rotation primitive spec, and no DEPLOYED client-layer migration path with verifiable active mainnet tx volume (closed-source, no explorer). Scored mid-low: client-layer-migration intent is described as a product offering, not evidenced as a deployed, measured path.

The chain is new (mainnet 2026-04-01); no protocol forks have occurred, and no formal upgrade mechanism, cadence, or coordinated-upgrade record is published. There is therefore no track record to credit. Low score reflects absence of evidence, not a contested fork.

Naoris's L1 is explicitly PURE post-quantum and does not ship a classical+PQ hybrid composition on its own chain (the described 'Hybrid Mode' is a product for wrapping EXTERNAL chains, not a mode applied to the Naoris L1). Under the v3.1 'hybrid mandatory' framing this scores low - the dimension rewards classical+PQ co-signing on the chain being scored, which Naoris by design does not do on its L1. Same structural tension as a PQ-native chain: penalized here for being pure-PQ rather than hybrid.

Naoris deploys no stateful hash-based signature scheme (no XMSS, LMS, or HORS is referenced); its signing is lattice (ML-DSA), which is stateless. Per the rubric, chains using only stateless schemes score the full 15 by default. The Stage-5 90-day state-management record requirement does not apply (no stateful scheme in scope).

N/A. The dPoSec consensus validator-signature aggregation approach is not described in any public document - there is no statement that validator voting uses Shor-vulnerable BLS aggregation (which would put it in 4f scope), nor any statement that it uses a PQ-safe equivalent. Because Shor-vulnerable signature aggregation at consensus cannot be CONFIRMED to be in scope from public sources, 4f is marked N/A and its weight (20) redistributes across 4a-4e. Dimension score = (5+9+4+3+15)/80 * 100 = 45.0 -> 45. Flagged as a Dim-4 evidence gap: if a future disclosure shows BLS aggregation in dPoSec, 4f would become in-scope and undeclared (score 0), lowering the dimension.

Naoris mainnet (live 2026-04-01) is PQ-native from genesis: multiple press outlets (CoinDesk 2026-04-03, The Quantum Insider 2026-04-01, crypto.news 2026-04-01, Decrypt 2026-04-02) corroborate that the production L1 signs transactions under a post-quantum scheme (ML-DSA-87 / 'Dilithium-5'), implying ~100% PQ signing traffic. HOWEVER this cannot be reconstructed by an independent third party: no working public mainnet block explorer for the native L1 was reachable as of 2026-06-02 (only a testnet explorer is referenced; the announced mainnet explorer was not independently usable), the client is closed-source (no public GitHub repos as of 2026-06-02), and all traffic figures are self-reported (Decrypt: 'has not independently verified these figures'). Per the Evidence-Reconstruction Gate, traffic-% credit is heavily discounted - scored 10/25 (launch-event-corroborated PQ-native architecture) rather than the ~24/25 a verifiable PQ-native mainnet would earn (cf. the verifiable-mainnet exemplar in the set). The Mainnet-Traffic Cap does not fire on the number because the chain is not <20% PQ; the limitation is verifiability, not low PQ share.

Zero verifiable PQC consensus-client code: the GitHub org (github.com/naorisprotocol) has no public repositories as of 2026-06-02, the chain client and ML-DSA implementation library are closed-source, and no merged PR or commit can be inspected. Cannot credit consensus-client PQC code that cannot be examined. Scored 0 per Gate 2 (not reconstructible).

Validator set is invite-only with undisclosed count, identity, and key distribution; no public data on how many validators sign under PQC keys. While the chain is PQ-native (implying validators use PQ keys), the adoption percentage cannot be verified from any public source. Scored 0 per Gate 2 (no reconstructible validator-key data).

Not auto-voided (5a > 0 because mainnet PQ launch is press-corroborated). But no protocol-enforced, dated, independently-verifiable next milestones are published: there is no consensus-enforced sunset/flag-day, no public roadmap of dated technical milestones with shipped artifacts, and no enforcement mechanism. The milestones that exist (mainnet launch, partnership announcements) are events, not protocol-enforced future commitments. Scored 0: no enforcement-mechanism-backed dated milestones.

Announced PQ claims substantially exceed independently-verifiable shipped PQC. Announced (trailing 12 months, foundation pages + press): Dilithium-5 / ML-DSA-87 mainnet signing, 106M+ PQ testnet transactions, ML-KEM (Kyber), Hybrid Mode, Sub-Zero Layer PQ-wrapping, Cross-Chain Trust Relay. Shipped-and-verifiable: press-corroborated mainnet launch under a PQ scheme + reliance on the FIPS-204 standard. Because the chain is closed-source and no working public mainnet explorer was reachable as of 2026-06-02, on-chain bytes signed under the exact named primitive cannot be verified, so most announced claims cannot be counted as shipped-and-verifiable. Estimated announced-to-verifiable ratio ~3.0x -> per the rubric this triggers a Dim 5 deduction (ratio >1.5) and an additional QRI cap 65 (ratio >2.0; non-binding since raw 27 < 65). Scored 6/15.

ML-DSA signature sizes are well above the 64-byte ECDSA/Ed25519 baseline (ML-DSA-44 ~2,420 B ~38x; ML-DSA-87, the probable 'Dilithium-5' mapping, is the largest of the family at ~4,600 B ~72x). Naoris documents no SNARK aggregation, data-availability offloading, batching, or any mechanism to bring the effective per-block multiplier down, and discloses no per-block signature footprint or user-laggard decay rate. With a >38x raw multiplier and no disclosed mitigation, scored 0 per the rubric ('>38x or undisclosed = 0').

Naoris targets wallets as a use case ('Wallet and Key Security' SDK for browser/mobile/hardware wallets, MPC frameworks, signing systems) and describes itself as a PQ security LAYER for third-party wallets, but no named wallet (MetaMask, Ledger, Phantom, Trezor, Safe) has publicly confirmed integration with the Naoris mainnet L1, and none publishes a Naoris-specific PQC roadmap. Low score: aspirational wallet targeting, no confirmed top-3 vendor integration or roadmap.

No bridge or cross-chain-messaging vendor (LayerZero, Wormhole, Axelar, CCIP) has announced integration with the Naoris native L1, and none publishes a Naoris-specific PQC roadmap. Naoris describes its own 'Cross-Chain Trust Relay' (trust-proof export), but that is a product, not a PQ-secured bridge with a vendor roadmap. Worst-tier alongside custodian/infra - drives the Supply-Chain cap.

No custodian (Anchorage, Fireblocks, Copper, BitGo, Komainu) has announced support for the NAORIS token or the Naoris L1, and none publishes a Naoris-specific PQ custody roadmap. The $NAORIS ERC-20 is held on centralized exchanges (Gate.io, Bitget, MEXC per CoinGecko 2026-06-02) using conventional ECDSA-secured Ethereum custody. No custodian-MPC path for ML-DSA is documented (ML-DSA is MPC-amenable in principle, but no Naoris custodian has implemented it). Low score.

No public RPC-provider list, no HSM vendor integration (Ledger HSM, Thales, YubiHSM, AWS KMS), and no TEE attestation chain (Intel TDX/SGX, AMD SEV-SNP, AWS Nitro) is documented for the Naoris L1; no infra vendor publishes a Naoris-specific PQC roadmap. Cross-tile weak-link: with wallet, bridge, custodian, and infra all near-zero, the dimension is capped by its weakest tiles - 4 of 4 tiles lack a top-3 vendor PQC roadmap, firing the Supply-Chain cap (Migration Stage <= 3).

Validator set is invite-only ('strategic participants, investors, and validator operators') with undisclosed validator count, identity distribution, and stake/hardware configuration; the Nakamoto coefficient and decentralization metrics are unverifiable. Token-weighted governance over cryptographic parameters concentrates influence among large early holders (Draper Associates, Mason Labs, Duck DAO, GDA). Low score: closed, undisclosed, investor-concentrated.

No coordinated protocol-upgrade record exists (mainnet only ~2 months old at evaluation), and no formal upgrade cadence, quorum, timelock, or emergency mechanism is published. Cadence-under-pressure is unproven. Low score reflects absence of any track record, not a failure event.

Named leadership is public: David Carvalho (founder/CEO, also titled Chief Scientist; public background is cybersecurity / former NATO intelligence, described as an ethical hacker) and Nathaniel Szerezla (CGO). The most senior security/strategy figure named in public materials is David Holtzman, described across primary coverage (U.Today, ITPro, Finance Magnates) as a Tech and Strategy ADVISOR on the advisory board (not a C-suite officer; his title is reported inconsistently across coverage); his public background is DNS architecture and a former IBM CTO/Chief Scientist role, i.e. internet/security infrastructure, not lattice/PQ cryptography. Additional advisors include Inge Kampenes (former Chief of Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence, heads Naoris Nordic operations) and Mick Mulvaney (Senior Advisor, former U.S. White House Chief of Staff). Deduction: NO named cryptography/PQ-specialist leader is listed - the senior security/strategy advisor (Holtzman) has no stated PQ-lattice-cryptography expertise, and no public officer is identified as the owner of the ML-DSA implementation - a governance gap for a chain whose entire thesis is a PQ primitive. Moderate score: credible general leadership, no named PQ-implementation owner.

Naoris's posture is proactive PQ-from-genesis, which is a positive structural signal, but it has executed no crypto migration under live adversarial pressure (none required - the chain started PQ-native) and has no incident-response plan published for a PQ-algorithm-compromise scenario. The proactive posture is credited modestly; an actual adversarial-coordination test is absent and untested.

No canary, honeypot, rate-limited-spending rule, or cryptographic tripwire is documented in Naoris's consensus or governance specs - and a CRQC-detection tripwire is less central to a PQ-native signing chain than to a classical one. Scored 0 per rubric (no mechanism documented). Note: a tripwire WOULD be relevant for the classically-secured ERC-20 economic layer on Ethereum, where none exists.